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One provision of the Affordable Care Act was to expand Medicaid eligibility for a 
greater number of low-income patients. The resulting increase in demand for care was 
largely explored, but the effect of the 2014 Medicaid expansion on the physician and 
advanced practitioner labor market has not been well researched by economists. Using 
pooled cross-sectional data from the 2010 – 2018 American Community Surveys, this 
paper examines whether the Medicaid expansion has caused notable changes in 
physician, physician assistant, and nurse practitioner hours, compensation, and overall 
employment. The literature shows that practices that employ nurse practitioners are far 
more likely to accept Medicaid patients due to the lower wage rates of nurse practitioners 
that offset lower reimbursement rates for Medicaid patients. This study finds that the 
weekly hours worked by nurse practitioners increased significantly in states that have 
implemented Medicaid expansion, whereas physicians and physician assistants saw no 
change in their hours or earnings. Further, Medicaid expansion led to no significant 
change in the overall employment of each type of provider in states. Thus, the response 
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A. History of Medicaid 
Medicaid and Medicare were established in 1965 as a part of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Social Security Amendments. While both programs existed to grant insurance 
coverage to groups of uninsured people, the programs derived funding from different 
sources. Presently, the federal government fully funds and administers health insurance 
for Medicare eligible citizens – those over the age of 65, with certain disabilities, or end-
stage renal disease (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation, 2017). 
In contrast, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program in which states receive financial 
assistance from the federal government to fund their own programs that insure low-
income families and individuals. In the five decades following the program’s initiation, 
Medicaid has undergone several changes in its structure such as expansions of eligibility 
and requirements for state participation. The core of the program, however, remains 
intact; Medicaid expands access to health services for low-income citizens.  
 
B. Medicaid and Public Health Insurance Expansion 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress voted to include low-income children with 
families outside of the eligibility requirements and pregnant women in Medicaid 
(Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2017). Considered the largest 
expansion prior to the ACA, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 
enrolled an additional 2 million children in Medicaid and authorized nearly $40 billion in 
funding over the following decade (Klemm, 2000). Other historical Medicaid expansions 
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stemmed from calls for coverage of the mentally ill, disabled, and other indigent groups. 
Early amendments to Medicaid granted coverage to these demographics, increasing 
enrollment by nearly 5% from 1972 to 1976 while also growing overall annual 
expenditure by 18%. In more recent years, enrollment increases have been largely driven 
by external factors. Due to the economic downturn in the early 2000s, enrollment in 
Medicaid grew tremendously; overall Medicaid spending increased commensurately by 
approximately one-third of its previous total (Holahan and Ghosh, 2005).  
 
C. Providers in the Health Care System 
Physicians – and increasingly, advanced practitioners such as physician assistants 
and nurse practitioners – are integral to the function of the healthcare system; they are the 
ultimate decision makers and leaders in health care delivery. As such, the current and 
future supply of physicians is of great concern to economists. Recently, studies have 
focused on the shortage of physicians in the United States, particularly that of primary 
care clinicians. The 2019 American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC) projection 
estimates that the supply of physicians will experience a shortfall of 46,900 to 121,900 
physicians by 2032 (American Association of Medical Colleges, 2019). This projected 
shortage operates under certain assumptions, one being that the average hours worked by 
physicians are experiencing a gradual decline. From 2000 to 2016, the overall hours 
worked by doctors has decreased due to several reasons including more stringent labor 
laws, physician pushback against employers, and integration of electronic medical 
records. Physicians and healthcare workers work some of the highest hours per week 
amongst all professional occupations. Between rising administrative work and more 
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complex care delivery systems, health professionals have sought to decrease their 
burdens. The downward trend in physician hours, however, reduces the supply of full-
time equivalent (FTE) physicians. If the decline in hours continues, the AAMC estimates 
an additional 20,900 physician shortfall by 2032 than if the hours remain the same.  
Concurrently, advanced practitioners such as physician assistants and nurse 
practitioners have been expanding in number and scope of practice. Physician assistants 
are providers that typically serve on teams with physicians or surgeons and other 
healthcare workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). Under the supervision of a 
physician, physician assistants conduct physicals, provide treatment, and in certain states, 
prescribe medication. To become a PA, a two-year master’s program is required after 
completion of a bachelor’s degree. The median annual wage for physician assistants is 
$108,610, significantly lower than that of a physician (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).  
Nurse practitioners also play a vital role in the delivery of care. To be certified as 
a nurse practitioner, students must graduate from a registered nurse (RN) degree program 
before completing a master’s or doctoral degree (American Association of Nurse 
Practitioners). The additional NP degree typically takes 2-4 years to complete after being 
certified as an RN. Once licensed, nurse practitioners may diagnose disease and prescribe 
medication within the scope of practice defined by their state of employment. Although 
the scope of practice varies from state to state, nurse practitioners have mostly filled roles 
in primary care in hospitals and private practices (Naylor and Kurtzman, 2010). Due to 
state variation in scope of practice laws, net migration has been observed in regions 
where policy is less restrictive on NPs. In terms of Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement, nurse practitioners typically receive around 75-85 percent of the payment 
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that physicians receive from providing the same services. Nurse practitioners earn a 
median wage of $107,030, significantly lower than that of the physician (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2018). The observed disparities in payment and scope of practice between 
advanced providers and physicians have raised debate about the nurse practitioner’s role 
in the future of health care delivery.  
 The projections of labor supply shortage raise concerns about the long-term 
sustainability of physicians as the drivers of the American health care system. 
Economists and industry experts have proposed that nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants continue to supplement care delivery. Of the several labor supply scenarios 
described in the 2019 AAMC report, the outcome with the greatest offset of the physician 
shortage is “APRN/PA high”, in which the number of NPs and PAs trained each year 
continue to grow at high rates. With a greater reliance – and emphasis – on primary care 
services as a solution to the nation’s huge healthcare expenditure and relatively poor 
outcomes, it remains to be seen if NPs and PAs can fill the shortage in the healthcare 
labor market. Preliminary research supports the ability of NPs and PAs to provide quality 
care services comparable with that of a primary care physician (Kurtzman and Barnow, 
2017). However, while the services may be similar, the current healthcare infrastructure 
does not necessarily support new NPs and PAs substituting for physicians in every 
circumstance. 
 
D. Contribution and Organization of this Paper 
The literature does not extensively cover the effects of the Medicaid expansion on 
the supply of providers in their respective states, much less the changes in hours that 
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these providers tend to work as a result. Medicaid expansion has been studied primarily 
from the utilization side and financial ramifications of implementation on the state and 
hospitals. Meanwhile, the change in the supply – specifically the hours, earnings, and 
number of workers – has not been studied. Using 2010-2018 annual data from the 
American Community Survey, this paper evaluates if these core measures of the provider 
labor supply have changed for the providers in the states that opted into ACA Medicaid 
expansion. My answer adds to the existing literature in that it draws from a nationally 
representative dataset and examines the specific effect of expansion in the health care 
provider labor market. I find that the weekly hours worked for nurse practitioners 
increase by ~1.5 hours in states that have opted into Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, I 
determine that Medicaid expansion has no significant effect on the annual earnings, 
weekly earnings, or state level employment of providers.  
This paper will first review the existing literature on the effect of Medicaid and 
public health expansions on health care utilization, health care supply, and provider work 
hours. The subsequent section describes the data sample used for analysis. Next, the 
econometric model of difference-in-difference analysis will be reviewed. Following an 
explanation of the model will be presentation of the analysis of the results and discussion 





REVIEW OF MEDICAID EXPANSION AND PROVIDER LABOR MARKET 
 
In 2009, President Obama assigned a team of physician leaders, healthcare 
economists, and policymakers to draft the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
Under the Affordable Care Act, the government intended to grant Medicaid eligibility to 
a greater number of low-income patients. The primary provision for Medicaid expansion 
was extended eligibility to all adults with incomes below 138% of the federal poverty 
line. However, following a June 2012 Supreme Court ruling in National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Medicaid expansion provision was rendered 
an opt-in policy by state. As of July 2019, 37 states (including the District of Columbia) 
have adopted Medicaid expansion while 14 states have not (Medicaid.gov, 2019). The 
ACA also stipulated that the federal government would pay the full expenses of state 
Medicaid costs for newly enrolled patients up to 2016 and thereafter would only cover 
90% of the costs. Many states and hospitals also possess certain Medicaid exceptions to 
the standard rules, such as disproportionate share hospitals that receive lump-sum 
payments for accepting a greater proportion of Medicaid patients in their payer mix or the 
District of Columbia only receiving a 70% cost coverage.  
 
A. Impact on Health Care Utilization 
 As of April 2019, CMS reports that 72.9 million individuals are enrolled in 
Medicaid or CHIP in 49 reporting states, a 26.1% increase over the baseline set in July-
September 2013 (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2019). This additional 
26.1% of Medicaid enrollees consists of both previously ineligible individuals and 
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eligible individuals (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2019). The 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission suggest that a “welcome-mat” 
effect that stems from increased public knowledge of eligibility requirements may have 
boosted enrollment for previously eligible individuals. As a whole, enrollment has 
increased in both expansion and non-expansion states, although the growth is 
proportionally larger in the expansion states. Courtmanche et al. (2017) use a difference-
in-differences model to evaluate American Community Survey data and found that 
expansion states experienced a 5.9% increase in Medicaid enrollees to non-expansion 
states’ 2.8%.  More recently, however, enrollment has actually started to decline; the 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2019) estimates a 1.6 million net decline in Medicaid or CHIP 
enrollment from December 2017 to December 2018. It remains to be seen whether this 
decline is a reflection of a resurging uninsured population or a transition from public to 
private insurance.  
By increasing the number of Medicaid-enrolled patients, the ACA expansion has 
driven higher rates of patient utilization. Sommers et al. (2016) survey over 1,000 
individuals in both Medicaid expansion and non-Medicaid expansion states and find that, 
on average, patients utilized a greater volume of primary care. Specifically, an increase in 
Medicaid eligibility was associated with an increase in utilization of preventative care 
and annual checkups as well as an improvement in self-reported health and health 
outcomes. However, in their comparison between Arkansas, a private insurance 
expansion state, and Kentucky, a Medicaid expansion state, Sommers et al. (2016) find 
many of the same effects on health utilization that are driven by expansion of the 
insurance pool not specific to Medicaid. When compared to Texas, a non-expansion state, 
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both Arkansas and Kentucky demonstrate greater health care access and outcomes. 
Generally, research supports that utilization will increase with any rise in enrollment, 
particularly in primary care services. This aligns with the temporary 2013 and 2014 
Medicaid policy that specifically increased payment for primary care reimbursement 
relative to coverage for other services (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access 
Commission, 2019).   
 
B. Impact on Health Care Supply 
Beyond the effects on the utilization and demand side, ACA Medicaid expansion 
has profoundly affected the business of physician practice. Physicians have been 
notoriously selective about their payer mix due to the detrimental impact of accepting 
publicly insured or uninsured patients on their bottom line. Lower levels of 
reimbursement, higher volume of paperwork, and other factors cause providers to favor 
private insurance over public as well as standard Medicaid over capitated Medicaid 
payments (Berman et al., 2002). The ACA sought to combat these barriers to health care 
delivery by increasing the payments from CMS to providers. However, advanced 
practitioners continue to remain reimbursed at a rate lower than that of their physician 
counterparts. 
Recent studies show a correlation between greater eligibility for Medicaid and 
increased supply of care for low-income patients (Chen, 2014). Analysis of medical 
expenditure panel data before and after expansion showed that when Medicaid 
enrollment is held constant, an increase in Medicaid reimbursement is associated with a 
commensurate increase in access to care by Medicaid patients. However, Chen (2014) 
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and Berman et al. (2002) find that the supply of physicians only rises when the level of 
reimbursement increases; when enrollment of Medicaid patients rises, physicians simply 
increase their work hours. These phenomena are further substantiated by Buchmueller et 
al. (2014) who investigate the response of providers to public health insurance 
expansions, specifically adult dental Medicaid benefits. In their study, Buchmueller et al. 
(2014) find that dentists see more publicly insured patients while maintaining their 
current number of privately insured patients in response to expansion of benefits. 
Empirically, they find that a 10% increase in dental coverage in the state corresponds 
with a 0.6 hour per week increase in time treating patients. To compensate for additional 
labor hours, dental practices hire more hygienists, which are the dental equivalent of 
physician assistants. Similarly, DiNardi (2017) identifies the effect of the Medicaid 
expansion on nurse hours. Using a difference-in-differences model to analyze data from 
the American Community Survey, Dinardi determines that both LPNs and RNs in 
expansion states raises hours worked per week by 1.6% overall (30-50 minutes per 
week), with the nurses in rural areas experiencing significantly greater increases.  
Making changes to the hours of health care workers can exert significant financial 
pressure on hospitals and private practices. Employers must address the costs associated 
with these changes in labor. For instance, an increase in nurse hours translates to the 
marginal cost of overtime wages in addition to the potential charges incurred by medical 
error due to fatigue (Dinardi, 2017). Alternatively, hiring a new nurse or clinician 
includes the marginal cost of wages and adjustment costs of hiring. To maximize profit, 
individual hospitals or practices must ensure that the composition of their staff optimizes 
the ratio of marginal revenue produced by one type of provider to their wages. Since 
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advanced practitioners are not always able to provide care independently of a physician, 
their marginal products of labor remain ambiguous. While studies have not specifically 
examined this economic model in provider supply, work has been done to determine if 
advanced practitioners produce the adequate FTEs and care outcomes to substitute for 
physicians. Laurant et al. (2018) conduct a review on 18 randomized trials to determine 
whether nurses and nurse practitioners can substitute for primary care doctors. Although 
patient outcomes and satisfaction were found to be similar or equal in most of these 
studies, the effect of nurse practitioner substitution on cost was unclear. With varying 
levels of reimbursement provided to advanced practitioners by Medicaid, assessing the 
marginal revenue product generated by hiring additional advanced practitioners is 
complicated. Consequently, the effect of Medicaid expansion on these markets remains 
unclear.  
 
C. Provider Labor Variables 
 Anecdotally, physicians – as well as other advanced practitioners – are known to 
work some of the longest hours and shifts amongst professionals. However, with recent 
concern for work-hours restrictions for newly trained residents and physician burnout, 
medicine has experienced a downtrend in hours regulated by healthcare agencies and 
government policy. Staiger et al. (2010) analyzes Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
and find that mean hours worked per week for all physicians decreased by 7.2% between 
1996 and 2008 (from 54.9 hours per week in 1996-98 to 51.0 hours per week in 2006-
2008). They determine that these decreases are also associated with lower physician fees, 
which suggests that a similar trend could occur in the presence of a public insurance 
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expansion. However, Staiger et al. could not conclusively link physician work hours to 
reimbursement levels. Liu (2019) substantiates this claim with a focus on the 2003 work-
limit regulation as the primary exogenous variable. Liu (2019) contends that the 2003 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) reform in resident 
work-hours limits decreased hours for all physicians and set a new working standard. 
Furthermore, Liu (2019) asserts that the reduction in work hours is inversely correlated 
with female physicians’ propensity to marry or have children, that is, female physicians 
are more likely to do so. It remains to be seen what kind of constantly changing, 
endogenous factors will cause fluctuations in provider work hours and how Medicaid 
expansion alters these factors.  
 This paper uniquely evaluates the effect that Medicaid expansion has on the work 
hours, weekly earnings, and annual earnings of physicians, physician assistants, and 
nurse practitioners. Whereas the literature has provided context for the trends over time in 
nationally representative samples, this study shows how Medicaid expansion specifically 





ESTIMATING EFFECTS ON THE PROVIDER LABOR MARKET 
 
A. Econometric Model  
 To determine the effect of the Medicaid expansion on physician work hours in 
expansion states, this study employs a difference-in-differences regression model. This 
technique mimics experimental design by studying the differential effect of an 
intervention, creating a quasi- “treatment” group and a “control” group. The model makes 
use of the cross-sectional data collected annually in the timeframe that is comprised of 
observations before and after the Medicaid expansion. In this case, the states that opted 
into Medicaid expansion are considered a treatment group and the states that did not opt 
in are considered the control. Thus, the model allows for causal inference of the policy 
intervention’s effect. The following econometric model is employed:  
 
Model I: Yist = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1EXPANSIONst + 𝛽2INSURANCEst + 𝛽3SELFEMPLOYEDist+ 
𝛽4AGEGROUPist + 𝛽5FEMALEist + 𝛽6HISPANICist + 𝛽7BLACKist + 𝛽8ASIANst + 
𝛽9OTHERist + 𝛽10MARRIEDist + 𝛼s + ƛt + εist 
Model II: Yst = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1EXPANSIONst + 𝛽2UNEMPLOYMENTst + 𝛽3LOG65st + 
𝛽4LOG5st + 𝛽5INSURANCEst + 𝛽6FEMALEst + 𝛽7HISPANICst + 𝛽8BLACKst + 
𝛽9ASIANst + 𝛽10OTHERst +𝛼s + ƛt + εst 
Where 𝛼s represents state fixed effects that control for differences between states, 
ƛt represents year fixed effects that control for yearly differences that affect the 
labor market,  
and ε is an error term.  
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The coefficient of interest in the equation is 𝛽1, which will estimate the effect of 
the Medicaid expansion in the expansion state on the provider dependent variables. 
Dependent Variables* 
Model I  
Hours worked per week Individual level variable -- the average 
number of hours worked by a provider on a 
weekly basis in last 12 months. 
 
Log of Annual Earnings Individual level variable – log of annual 
earnings for the provider for the year, 
including self-employed and employed 
income 
 
Log of Hourly Earnings Individual level variable – log of the hourly 
earnings for the provider, including self-
employed and employed income 
 
Model II  
Log of employment State level outcome variable – log of number 
of providers working in the state  
 
Independent Variables – Model I* 
EXPANSION  1 - if the provider works in a Medicaid 
expansion state 
INSURANCE Share of individuals covered under health 
insurance other than Medicaid in state 
SELFEMPLOYED  1 – if the provider receives self-employment 
income 
AGEGROUP  
25-30 1 – if the provider is aged 25-30 
31-35 1 – if the provider is aged 31-35 
36-40 1 – if the provider is aged 36-40 
41-45 1 – if the provider is aged 41-45 
46-50 1 – if the provider is aged 46-50 
51-55 1 – if the provider is aged 51-55 
56-60 1 – if the provider is aged 56-60 
61-65 1 – if the provider is aged 61-65 
66-70 1 – if the provider is aged 66-70 
70+ 1 – if the provider is aged over 70 
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FEMALE 1 – if the provider is female 
HISPANIC 1 – if the provider is Hispanic 
BLACK 1 – if the provider is married 
ASIAN 1 – if the provider is Asian 
OTHER 1 – if the provider is another race/ethnicity 
MARRIED 1 – if the provider is married 
 
Independent Variables – Model II* 
EXPANSION  1 - if the provider works in a Medicaid 
expansion state 
UNEMPLOYMENT  Unemployment rate of the state 
LOG65 Log of the number of individuals in the state 
aged over 65 years old 
LOG5 Log of the number of individuals in the state 
aged under 5 years old 
INSURANCE Proportion of individuals covered under 
health insurance other than Medicaid in state 
FEMALE Proportion of population in the state that are 
female 
HISPANIC Proportion of population in the state that are 
Hispanic 
BLACK Proportion of population in the state that are 
black 
ASIAN Proportion of population in the state that are 
Asian 
OTHER Proportion of population in the state that are 
another race/ethnicity 
 
*Variables are assessed in separate regressions by provider type: physicians, physician 
assistants, and nurse practitioners 
 
B. Explanation of variables 
 The EXPANSION dummy variable serves as the variable of interest that 
demarcates whether an individual provider works in an ACA Medicaid expansion state. 
For a majority of the Medicaid expansion states, 2013 serves as the year prior to the 
Medicaid expansion, and the beginning of 2014 onwards exhibits the difference after the 
Medicaid expansion intervention. A select few states that implemented Medicaid 
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expansion after January 2014 are coded such that the number of months after January 
2014 are counted as a proportion of a full year for Medicaid expansion. For example, 
since Michigan implemented Medicaid expansion in April 2014, the value of the 
EXPANSION for Michigan in the 2014 is 0.75, as the policy was only in effect for 75% 
of the year. While many of the providers who do reside in expansion states may not 
accept Medicaid patients and would ostensibly not be affected by the expansion, there are 
indirect effects of an increase in insured patients on extraneous practices. Thus, this study 
considers the broad effect of Medicaid expansion on the provider hours, not specifically 
the effect of changes in health insurance coverage of their patients. This variable will 
approximate the effect of Medicaid expansion on the physician work hours in expansion 
states as compared to the non-expansion states.  
There are a limited number of proven independent variables that predict for 
provider work hours and earnings; I selected controls for Model I based on findings in 
literature. As discussed by Staiger et al. (2010), physician fees and reimbursement are 
somewhat associated with the number of hours they work. Thus, the variable 
INSURANCE - the data of which I acquire from the United States Census Bureau - will 
control for the different insurance rates in the physician’s respective state. Furthermore, 
the control variable SELFEMPLOYED differentiates whether a provider receives self-
employed income versus solely salaried income. Given that a high number of providers 
generate equity in group practices, this measure will control for the inherent differences 
in patient-mix between self-employed providers and employed providers. Next, the age 
group variables control for the age of the provider. The five-year increment is selected 
based on the general hierarchical structure of the medical profession. Younger providers 
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(25-30, 31-35) tend to be interns or residents, a status that directly impacts the number of 
hours and compensation a provider receives. Middle aged providers (46-50, 51-55) tend 
to work standard hours and receive greater compensation than their younger counterparts. 
Finally, older providers (66-70, 70+) may be heading towards retirement and slowly 
decreasing their hours – and consequently, their compensation. Liu (2019) finds strong 
differences between the sexes, as female physicians have different career and familial 
trajectories that can lead them to reduce their hours, hence the FEMALE dummy 
variable. HISPANIC, BLACK, ASIAN, and OTHER dummy variables are included to 
round out the demographics of the individual provider. The literature asserts that race and 
ethnicity have strong socioeconomic effects, and these are accounted for with these 
dummy variables.  
I selected the state-level controls in Model II based on precedent set in literature. 
Dinardi (2017) uses the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYED), log of the share of the 
state population over 65 years old (LOG65), and log of the share of the state population 
under 5 years old (LOG5) to control for state-level employment. The exact selection of 
these controls are not specifically justified by Dinardi, but it appears that they help to 
differentiate the composition of the potential patient population in each state. I also 
include FEMALE, HISPANIC, BLACK, ASIAN, and OTHER variables as shares of the 
demographic in each state. These serve to control the socioeconomic differences between 





SELECTING THE SAMPLE FROM THE  
 
2010 – 2018 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
 
A. Overview of the American Community Survey 
 This study uses annual data from the 2010 – 2018 American Community Survey 
1-Year Data to determine the relationship between the onset of Medicaid expansion in 
2014 and the change in physician work hours. The American Community Survey (ACS) 
is conducted by the United States Census Bureau on a yearly basis to provide data for 
distribution of federal and state funds.  
The survey is administered to over 3.5 million Americans every year and asks 
about social, economic, housing, and demographic characteristics. The United States 
Census Bureau mails the survey forms to approximately 295,000 random addresses every 
month; if the forms are not completed after the first month, the Bureau sends surveyors to 
interview the addresses personally through telephone or in-person. Employment and 
labor information are collected from individuals who are a part of the labor force.  
The United States Census Bureau also administers the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), which is another national, comprehensive household survey. The Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) portion of the CPS has several similarities to the 
ACS, with a few key differences that drove the selection of the ACS as the data source 
for this study. First, the CPS ASEC sample is much smaller than that of the ACS. 
Whereas the CPS ASEC surveys around 75,000 households annually, the ACS surveys 
over 3.5 million. Since this study looks at variables from specific occupations, the larger 
sample of the ACS serves to increase the power of this study. Moreover, the top coding 
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for the income question is higher in the ACS than on the CPS ASEC, which provides 
more detailed information for the earnings variable in this paper. 
B. Selection of the Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The individual-level sample used in this study is comprised of 87,196 physicians, 
9,816 physician assistants, and 13,367 nurse practitioners over the 9-year period. This 
sample was produced by using the American Community Survey occupation codes 
specific to “physicians and surgeons”, “physician assistants”, and “nurse practitioners”. 
Notably, the occupation coding changed in the 2018 data, separating “physicians” and 
“surgeons”. I categorize all individuals with these occupation codes into the physician 
sample. Given the ACS survey methodology of randomly sampling every year, I assume 
that each of the observations corresponds to a unique individual in any given year as 
opposed to a single individual providing multiple observations over multiple years. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of physicians. On 
average, the physicians in this sample work about 50 hours per week. The average age of 
the physician in this sample is slightly above 48 years. The proportion of physicians in 
this sample who are female is 0.351.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of physician assistants. 
On average, the physician assistants in this sample work about 41 hours per week. The 
average age for the physician assistants in this sample is around 41 years old. The 
proportion of physician assistants in this sample who are female is 0.671.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of nurse practitioners. On 
average, the nurse practitioners in this sample work slightly less than 40 hours per week. 
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The average age of nurse practitioners in this sample is about 46.5 years old. The 
proportion of nurse practitioners in this sample who are female is 0.912. 
 
C. Limitations of the Data 
I filtered out unemployed individuals who reported occupation codes or those 
who were not active in the labor force in the given year. I dropped 489 individuals in the 
study who were under the age of 25 to avoid mischaracterizations in occupation. I also 
dropped 68 individuals who reported no employed or self-employed income, as this 
generated a missing value in the log of wages variable. This may have caused the data to 
be less representative of the actual provider population, as missing variables were 
disproportionately distributed among the states. 
Notably, the state level data was missing several observations in the physician 
assistant and nurse practitioner sample. For certain states in certain years, the ACS 
simply did not collect individuals with these occupations. This causes the data to be not 
fully representative of the employment in every state over time for physician assistants 





ESTIMATION RESULTS: QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF  
 
MEDICAID EXPANSION ON THE PROVIDER LABOR MARKET  
 
A. Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Individual Providers 
 
For each of the three types of providers in our data, I estimate the effect of 
Medicaid expansion on their hours, log annual earnings, and log of weekly wages. I 
employ models with and without state-specific linear trends that control for secular 
changes by state and year.  
Estimates of the difference-in-differences regression effects at the individual level 
for physicians are presented in Table 4. Column 1 contains the regression model that does 
not include state-specific linear trend. Column 2 contains the model that does include 
state-specific linear trend. Both models include the same control variables as described 
previously in Chapter III. Furthermore, standard errors in both models are clustered by 
state. All else held equal, the physicians in Medicaid expansion states did not experience 
any significant changes in their weekly hour, annual salaries, or hourly wages as a result 
of working in a Medicaid expansion state following the policy implementation.  
Estimates of the difference-in-differences regression effects at the individual level 
for physician assistants are presented in Table 5. Column 1 contains the regression model 
that does not include state-specific linear trend. Column 2 contains the model that does 
include state-specific linear trend. Both models include the same control variables as 
previously described. Standard error in both models are clustered by state. Without 
controlling for state-specific linear trend, the weekly hours worked by physician 
assistants significantly increased in states that expanded Medicaid. On average, these 
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physician assistants worked 1.099 hours longer per week than their counterparts that did 
not reside in states with Medicaid expansion. However, when including the state-specific 
linear trend, the regression model fails to identify a significant increase in weekly hours 
worked by physician assistants. Physician assistants in Medicaid expansion states do not 
experience any significant changes in their annual salary or hourly wages following the 
policy implementation.  
Estimates of the difference-in-differences regression effects at the individual level 
for nurse practitioners are presented in Table 6. Column 1 contains the regression model 
that does not include state-specific linear trend. Column 2 contains the model that does 
include state-specific linear trend. Both models include the same control variables as 
previously described. Standard error in both models are clustered by state. Controlling for 
other factors, nurse practitioners in Medicaid expansion states after implementation of the 
policy experienced significant increases in hours (p < 0.05). Both models estimate a rise 
in nurse practitioner’s hours, with the regression that includes state-specific linear trend 
presenting a 1.522 hour increase in weekly hours worked. Furthermore, nurse 
practitioners in Medicaid expansion states saw a significant decrease in their hourly 
wages when the regression controlled for state-specific linear trend. The log of hourly 
wages declined by 0.0638 for nurse practitioners in Medicaid expansion states, which 
equates to a $1.06 decrease in hourly wages. However, nurse practitioners that 
experienced Medicaid expansion saw no significant change in their annual salaries. 
 My findings mostly align with that of the study conducted by Dinardi (2017). 
Dinardi investigates the hours worked by LPNs and RNs and finds that those who work 
in states with Medicaid expansion experienced a 30 to 50-minute increase in hours 
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worked per week. Similarly, my results show an increase in nurse practitioner hours of 
1.522 hours per week. However, the comparison between LPNs/RNs and nurse 
practitioners cannot be taken without considering the difference in the professions. While 
LPNs/RNs and nurse practitioners share similar educational background in nursing, their 
scope of practice and work environment differ substantially. LPNs and RNs are not 
licensed to diagnose disease or prescribe medication, and they typically work irregular 
shifts in the hospital setting. In contrast, nurse practitioners are mid-level practitioners 
that are able to diagnose and prescribe medication; they typically work in private 
practices that schedule more standard hours. Thus, the conclusions made by Dinardi 
about the increase in demand of the nurse labor market do not entirely translate to that of 
the NP labor market. Nurse practitioners fulfill clinician and primary care needs in 
private practice settings that standard nurses cannot, and vice versa. Barnes et al. (2016) 
finds that the practices that employ nurse practitioners are more likely to accept Medicaid 
patients than those that do not employ nurse practitioners. This may explain Medicaid 
expansion’s unique effect on the nurse practitioner market; greater demand from 
Medicaid patients is funneled to the practices that employ nurse practitioners, thereby 
causing an increase in hours worked. However, the results of my study were incongruent 
with Chen’s findings that saw physician increase hours in response to greater enrollment 
(Chen, 2014).    
 The differing results for nurse practitioners and physician assistants pose 
the question of why the effects of Medicaid expansion vary between the two. Although 
both providers are defined as “advanced practitioners”, the practice environment of the 
average nurse practitioner differs from that of a physician assistant. Barnes et al. (2016) 
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examine the practice characteristics of NPs and PAs in medical practices using the 2012 
SK&A physician and NP/PA files. 47.0% of NPs reported to working in primary care 
practices, whereas only 39.3% of PAs and 30.2% of physicians reported the same. In 
states that reimbursed nurse practitioners at 100% of the physician Medicaid fee-for-
service rate, practices with NPs had 23% higher odds of accepting Medicaid patients than 
those that did not employ NPs (Barnes et al., 2016). Thus, in Medicaid expansion states 
where utilization of primary care increased, nurse practitioners experienced greater 
demand than their physician assistant counterparts.  
 
B. Effect of Medicaid Expansion on State Employment 
I estimate the effect of Medicaid expansion on the aggregate provider 
employment of each state by year. I employ models with and without state-level controls 
as well as models with and without state-specific linear trends.  
Estimates of the difference-in-differences regression effects of Medicaid 
expansion at the aggregate state level on employment for all providers, physicians, 
physician assistants, and nurse practitioners are presented in Table 7. Column 1 contains 
the regression model that does not include state controls or state-specific linear trend. 
Column 2 contains the model that includes state controls but does not include state-
specific linear trend. Column 3 contains the model that includes state-specific linear trend 
but does not include state controls. Column 4 contains the model that includes both state 
controls and state-specific linear trend. Medicaid expansion was associated with a 
significant increase in physician assistant employment in the two models that did not 
include state-specific linear trend. The log of physician assistant employment in states 
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with Medicaid expansion rose by 0.226 and 0.247 in models with and without state 
controls, respectively.  
My findings differ slightly from the results of the studies conducted by Chen 
(2014) and Berman et al. (2002), who determine that the supply of physicians – and other 
providers – increase in response to increases in reimbursement. In contrast, my results 
show that the employment of physicians in each state did not significantly increase due to 
Medicaid expansion, despite evidence pointing to reimbursement increasing for certain 
specialties, such as ED physicians (Lynch et al., 2019). However, my study did not 
specifically investigate the reimbursement changes for all providers in Medicaid 
expansion states. The lack of significant change in physician hours may be due to a lack 
of specificity; different specialties may have experienced different effects in employment 







A. Summary of Findings 
Using annual, cross-sectional data from the American Community Survey, this 
paper evaluates the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on the provider labor market. 
My study adds to the literature on the effect of public health expansions on the health 
care supply, particularly with the growing employment of advanced practitioners.  
The results of the analysis show that the nurse practitioners in the states with 
Medicaid expansion are more likely to work a greater number of hours than their 
counterparts in non-Medicaid expansion states. I speculate that this occurrence could be 
due to the composition of practices that do accept Medicaid patients; these practices are 
more likely to employ nurse practitioners and therefore must accommodate for increased 
health care demand by increasing hours worked.  
 
B. Policy Implications 
My analysis would be improved with the addition of information about the type of 
area the provider resides in, either rural or urban. With a policy as tied to socioeconomics 
as Medicaid expansion, obtaining this private information from the American 
Community Survey would have been highly valuable. Nonetheless, the findings of this 
study should be used to help guide economists and policymakers in their decisions about 
health care labor. Nurse practitioners appear to be filling the demand for health care, and 
the increase in their hours in expansion states elucidates how hospitals and practices are 
profit maximizing input of labor. In areas where the Medicaid reimbursement for nurse 
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practitioners is equal to that of a physician, the marginal revenue of labor generated may 
be enough to justify increasing the hours worked by the NP. Given that nurse 
practitioners in states with greater scope of practice have higher odds of working in 
primary care, Medicaid expansion states should consider enacting less restrictive scope of 
practice laws for NPs and reimburse at an equivalent rate as that of physicians (Barnes et 
al., 2016). This may enable practices and hospitals to hire more advanced practitioners 
without losing out on profit. With a growing shortage of physicians and ever-increasing 
demand for affordable primary care, nurse practitioners are uniquely positioned to fulfill 
the needs in the labor supply. 
 
C. Suggestions for Future Research  
Given the differences in patient populations among specialties in medicine, a 
study into the effect of Medicaid expansion with data on the provider specialty could 
uncover the more nuanced effects of the policy. Determining which fields of medicine are 
most affected by public health expansions for low-income patients would help 
policymakers to target areas with inefficiencies and with the greatest potential to fill the 
gap in the labor market. Further, research can be done to look at how the advanced 
practitioner market responds to changes in the labor market of the other providers, i.e. 
how does supply of physician assistants change in response to an expansion in scope of 
practice for nurse practitioners? This research can direct health care policy to be enacted 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for physicians 
























Dependent Variables  
Weekly hours 50.37 16.34 1.00 99.00 
Annual earnings  
(2018 constant dollars) 
207,010.40 153,735.60 1.00 1,256,177 
Hourly earnings  
(2018 constant dollars)  
101.04 144.83 1.00 14,687.81 
Independent Variables  
Age (years) 48.55 13.31 25 96 
Female 0.351 0.477 0 1 
Married 0.793 0.405 0 1 
Black 0.0395 0.195 0 1 
Asian 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Hispanic 0.0589 0.235 0 1 
Other race/ethnicity 0.0204 0.141 0 1 
Number of Observations: 87,196 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for physician assistants 
Notes: Nominal dollars for each physician are converted to 2018 real dollars using 
adjusted income provided by the American Community Survey and the 2018 Consumer 
Price Index. Independent variables are weighted according to the annual weights 
provided by each of the years in the 2010-2018 American Community Survey Public Use 




Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables  
Weekly hours 41.21 11.24 1.00 99.00 
Annual earnings  
(2018 constant dollars) 
80,891.69 60,708.20 1.00 1,057,673 
Hourly earnings  
(2018 constant dollars) 
44.84 32.66 1.00 1,045.85 
Independent Variables  
Age (years) 41.33 11.82 25 94 
Female 0.671 0.469 0 1 
Married 0.684 0.465 0 1 
Black 0.0525 0.223 0 1 
Asian 0.0659 0.248 0 1 
Hispanic 0.0772 0.267 0 1 
Other race/ethnicity 0.0204 0.141 0 1 
Number of Observations: 9,816 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for nurse practitioners 
Notes: Nominal dollars for each physician are converted to 2018 real dollars using 
adjusted income provided by the American Community Survey and the 2018 Consumer 
Price Index. Independent variables are weighted according to the annual weights 
provided by each of the years in the 2010-2018 American Community Survey Public Use 







Dependent Variables  
Weekly hours 39.80 11.01 1.00 99.00 
Annual earnings  
(2018 constant dollars) 
84,926.04 44,765.03 92.36 619,240 
Hourly earnings  
(2018 constant dollars) 
48.74 79.80 1.00 8,751 
Independent Variables  
Age (years) 46.51 11.70 25 95 
Female 0.912 0.282 0 1 
Married 0.731 0.443 0 1 
Black 0.0493 0.216 0 1 
Asian 0.0481 0.213 0 1 
Hispanic 0.0414 0.199 0 1 
Other race/ethnicity 0.0127 0.316 0 1 
Number of Observations: 13,367 
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Table 4: Effect of Medicaid expansion on physician hours, annual earnings, and 
hourly earnings 
 (1) (2) 




R2 = 0.097 
-0.594 
(0.439) 
R2 = 0.098 




R2 = 0.210 
-0.0374 
(0.0279) 
R2 = 0.211 




R2 = 0.254 
-0.0248 
(0.0255) 
R2 = 0.255 
 
State Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 









Notes:  The standard errors are presented in parentheses. Each coefficient is generated by 
a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered by state. Column (1) includes state 
and year fixed effects. Column (2) additionally includes a state-specific linear trend. Both 
columns include individual controls for if the provider receives self-employed earnings, 
the provider’s age group, sex, ethnicity (Hispanic, black, Asian, other), and marriage 
status. Both columns also include a state control for the share of the population in their 
state covered under insurance that is not Medicaid.  
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 




Table 5: Effect of Medicaid expansion on physician assistant hours, annual 
earnings, and hourly wages 
 (1) (2) 




R2 = 0.076 
0.552 
(0.997) 
R2 = 0.080 




R2 = 0.139 
.0642  
(0.0693) 
R2 = 0.146 




R2 = 0.114 
0.0319  
(0.0382) 
R2 = 0.120 
 
State Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 









Notes:  The standard errors are presented in parentheses. Each coefficient is generated by 
a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered by state. Column (1) includes state 
and year fixed effects. Column (2) additionally includes a state-specific linear trend. Both 
columns include individual controls for if the provider receives self-employed earnings, 
the provider’s age group, sex, ethnicity (Hispanic, black, Asian, other), and marriage 
status. Both columns also include a state control for the share of the population in their 
state covered under health insurance that is not Medicaid.  
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 




Table 6: Effect of Medicaid expansion on nurse practitioner hours, annual earnings, 
and hourly wages 
 (1) (2) 




R2 = 0.061 
1.522** 
(0.667) 
R2 = 0.065 




R2 = 0.082 
-0.0474  
(0.0491) 
R2 = 0.085 




R2 = 0.042 
-0.0638** 
(0.0285) 
R2 = 0.047 
 
State Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 









Notes:  The standard errors are presented in parentheses. The values in the table represent 
the regression coefficients for each dependent variable. Standard error is clustered by 
state. Column (1) includes state and year fixed effects. Column (2) adds a state-specific 
linear trend. Both columns include individual controls for if the provider receives self-
employed earnings, the provider’s age group, sex, ethnicity (Hispanic, black, Asian, 
other), and marriage status. Both columns also include a state control for the share of the 
population in their state covered under insurance that is not Medicaid.  
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 












Table 7: Effect of Medicaid expansion on log of employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









































State Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 
State Controls 


















Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses. The values in the table represent 
the regression coefficients for each dependent variable. Standard error is clustered by 
state. Column (1) includes state and year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) additionally 
include state-specific linear trends. Columns (2) and (4) additionally include state 
controls for the unemployment rate, proportion of population covered under insurance 
other than Medicaid, population shares (female, Hispanic, black, Asian, other), log of the 
population age 65 and over, and log of the population age 5 and under. These controls are 
weighted according to the person weights provided by American Community Survey. 
Observation counts for physician assistants and nurse practitioners are less than 459 due 
to lack of observations of these occupations by the American Community Survey in 
certain states by year.  
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
